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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The following issues are presented on appeal:
1.

Did the trial court err in refusing to grant mistrial

after a prosecution witness conversed with jurors during a trial
recess?
2.

Did the trial court err in refusing to supress infor-

mation obtained in the warrantless search and seizure of defendant's
automobile?
3.

Did two jurors1 viewing of defendant in police custody

during trial deny the defendant of a fair trial and equal protection
of the law?
4.

Did the trial court err in instructing the ;ury that they

could convict the defendant of both theft of an operable motor vehicle
and possession of that same stolen vehicle?

Should the defendant's

conviction of possession of a stolen vehicle be reversed and vacated
where he was also convicted of theft of that same vehicle?

Finally,

was the defendant entitled to a lesser included offense iistruction
of possession of a stolen vehicle?

vi

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

:
:

v,

:

PHILLIP PAUL LAROCCO,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 860069
Category No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Appellant, Phillip Paul Larocco, appeals from a conviction
and judgment imposed for one count of Theft of an Operable Motor
Vehicle, a Felony of the Second Degree, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. §76-6-404 and §76-6-412 (1953 am amended) and one count of
Possession of a Stolen Vehicle, a Felony of the Third Degree, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-1-112 (1953 as amended).

The Appel-

lant was found guilty by a jury after a trial which occurred on
December 9 and 10, 1985.

On January 10, 1986, the Appellant was

sentenced to concurrent indeterminate terms of incarceration at
the Utah State Prison of one to fifteen years for the second degree
felony and zero to five years for the third degree felony.

All

proceedings occurred in the Third Judicial District Court, in and
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable David B. Dee,
Judge presiding.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In June of 1981 a 1973 Ford Mustang owned by William Padilla
was stolen from his car lot, State Auto Sales, by a man who took
the car for a test drive and never returned it. (R. 186). The salesman assisting the man was David Luce. (R. 18 6). The theft was
reported to the police and Mr. Luce provided information about the
thief the same day that the theft occurred. (R.202). Luce described
the thief as a white male, approximately 5'8" to 5 f 10" tall and
weighing approximately 160 to 165 lbs., and said that the thief
resembled the actor Dom DeLuise. (R.202). The police did not arrest
anyone at that time.
Four years later, in May of 1985, David Luce, now a salesman at
a different car lot, believed he saw the same man at the new lot.
(R.190)

He obtained information regarding the man and replayed that

information to Padilla (R.192).

Padilla subsequently went to the

neighborhood where the man allegedly lived and spotted a 1973 Ford
Mustang parked in front of the Defendant's residence. (R.215). That
car was very similar to the car which was stolen from his lot in 1981.
Padilla reported this information to the police. (R.215).

Padilla

did not see or speak to the defendant or anyone* else. (R.2L5) .
Approximately two or three days later, Salt Lake County Detective
Robison

went to the defendant's address and saw a 1973 Ford Mustang

parked in front of the defendant's house in the same place that
Padilla reported seeing it several days earlier. (R. 231). She noted
the license number of the car, its description, and the address, and
left without further approaching the vehicle or the residence at that
time.

She conducted further investigation by running the plate number
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and receiving back an associated VIN number (3F05H101968).

A

VIN search thorugh the Department of Motor Vehicles revealed
that the car which was originally registered under such number,
a 1973 Mach One Ford Mustang, was purchased new in 1973, by Neal
Hailes of Salt Lake City,
1975.

It was registered to Hailes through

The next registration entry for such VIN number was to the

Defendant in 1981. (R.232-33).
Approximately one week later, on June 6, 1985, Detective
Robison,

Salt Lake County Detective Owen, and Kip Ingersoll from

the Department of Motor Vehicles went back to the Defendant's home
and, again, the 1973 Ford Mustang was parked in front of the home.
(R.234).

The police looked through the windshield and saw 3F05H101968,

vehicle identification number on the dashboard which did not match
the VIN# of the vehicle taken from Padilla's lot four years previously.
(R.235-36).

The police then opened the door and entered the car with-

out a warrant.

(See Stipulation of Facts submitted in connection with

Defendant's Motion to Suppress on August 6, 1985; Addendum A ) .

After

opening the car door, the police found a different VIN, 3F05H164088,
on the safety standard sticker located on the inside edge of the door
(R.235).

The VIN on the dashboard matched that of a vehicle pre-

viously owned by Mr. Neil Hailes (R.237). The VIN on the safety standard
sticker matched that of the Ford Mustang stolen from State Auto Sales
in 1981 (R.235).

The police, at this point, approached the Defendant's

residence and arrested him.
At no time during Padilla's visit to look at the car or during
Detective Robisonfs

first visit to look at the car did either of them

have any contact with the Defendant or anyone in his household; during

-3-

Detective Robison's

second visit to the location on June 6, 1985,

contact was made with the Defendant and other household members
only after police had opened the car door (See Stipulation of
Facts submitted in connection with Defendant's Motion to Suppress
on August 6, 1985.) (R.15)(Addendum A ) .

There was no indication

that the Defendant was even aware that his car was being inspected
or that he was a suspect up to the point where contact was made
with him on June 6, 1985 (See Stipulation of Facts submitted in
connection with Defendant's Motion to Suppress on August 6, 1985).
(R.30-34) .
Upon being contacted by the police on June 6, 1985, the Defendant
told them he had purchased the car from Streator Chevrolet in 1981
(R.239); the Defendant's brother-in-law also gave the police a Utah
Certificate of Title showing a Ford Mustang with VIN 3F05H101968
belonging to the Defendant (R.240-241).
After impounding the vehicle, Kipp Ingersoll of the Division of
Motor Vehicles located another shorter version of a VIN on the car's
frame; this shorter VIN was similar to the VIN of the stolen Padilla
Vehicle. (R.269-72).

Mr. Ingersoll also discovered that the VIN tag

on the dashboard had been glued on rather than riveted (VDI. II Tr.7-8);
however, that dashboard VIN tag did not appear abnormal ii anyway upon
Mr. Ingersoll's inspection of it from the exterior of the vehicle
(R. 283). Subsequent investigation revealed that the VIN on the dashboard tag matched a vehicle owned by Neil Hailes which was totally
destroyed in a car accident in December of 1975 (R.233,253).
Prior to the trial, Defendant filed a timely Motion to Suppress
seeking to suppress evidence obtained by the police as a result of
their warrantless search of the Defendant's vehicle on June 6, 1985;
-4-

that motion was denied by the trial court. (R.60).
During the course of the trial, it came to the attention of the
parties

1 the court that one of the jurors, Ms. Lembke, had a

conversation with a prosecution witness, Neil Hailes, during a
recess. (R, lb4) . The conversation was mostly general in nature
It 4) hut- there was some conversation regarding the questions
asked of the jury panel JII <

dire (R.166).

The witness, Neil

Hailes, told the juror that he was suprised that ill jury panelists
had indicate-) Uiat they would not give greater weight to the testimony
of a police officer because tie himself would believe a police officer
more than a lay witness (R.166)-

Ms. Lembke stated that this conver-

sation with Mr. Hailes would not affect her deliberation in any way
(R.168)

The Defendant moved t

a mistrial because of this conversa-

tion but the motion was denied (R.168-69).
In I i^ requested jury instructions, the Defendant proposed that
the trial court instruct the jur/ I hat Count II, Possession of a
Stolen Vehicle, was a lesser included offense of Count T, Theft (of
an operable motor vehicle); the requested instruction was denied,
(R.324) and Instruction N<
(R.324).

In

qiven despite the Defendant's objectio

The jury returned a guilty verdict on both counts (R.325).

After the jury returned its verdict, the trial court learned that
two members of the jury had seen something which indicated that the
Defendant was in custody at the time of trial.

Juror

Bragg told the

court that she saw the Defendant being escorted down the stairs by a
man wearing a suit (R.328); although the juror's statement does not
directly reflect it, the Defendant was cleaiIj handcuffed.

Juror

Broadhead ^aw the Defendant being placed into a police car. (R.328-29).
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Both jurors told the court that these observations did not have any
influence on their determinations in the case. (R.329).
On January 10, 1986, the Defendant made a timely Motion to
Arrest Judgment based upon the juror's conversation with the prosecution witness and also upon the observations of the jurors that led
them to realize the defendant was in custody. (R.104-05).

That

motion was denied. (R.345).
The Defendant was sentenced by the court on January 10, 1986.
The Defendant, having been convicted of both Theft (of an operable
motor vehicle) and also Possession of a Stolen Vehicle argued that,
under Section 76-1-402 Utah Code Annotated, he could only be sentenced
once.

(R.345-46). The court, however, chose to sentence on both

charges - 0 to 5 years at the Utah State Prison on Count II, and 1 to
15 years at the Utah State Prison on Count I to run concurrently.
(R.349-50).
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I
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The first argument presented on appeal conr* ins the discussion
between tivo jurors and a prosecution witness during a trial recess.
The trial court erred in not presuming prejudice and therefore erred
in refusing to grant the Appellant's motion for mistrial.
The second argument presented is that the search of the
Appellant"* vehicle violated his federal and Utah Constitutional
rights to be free from unreasonable searci

tn«l loizurr,

The appellant

has standing to raise the issue because there was a bona-fide legal
issue as to ownership of the car.

The search was lacking probable cause

because the vehicle identification number in pi i m view of the police
officers was registered to the Appellant.

Even if there was probable

cause, the w a n anLless search of the vehicle did not come within any
specific exceptions to the warrant requirement and was therefore unconstitutional.

The trial court erred in refusing to suppress the

evidence obtained m

the search.

The third argument is that the Appellant

f

Light to a fair trial

was prejudiced as a result of jurors seeing him in police custody on
at least two occasiin^.

The Appellant was prejudiced by the jurors'

recognition of him as being incarcerated at thu time of trial.

This

viewing violated both the Appellant fs rights to a fair trial and
his right to equal protection of the laws.
The final argument is that the trial c
the jury that the Appellant could be convicted

• ' in instructing
i i.** t. h possession of

a stolen vehicle aiul 1 ho theft of that same vehicle.
is encompassed by the theft, and therefoio, H
ment against the Appellant under both statutes.
-7-

The possession

i. error to enter judgeFurthermore, the

Appellant was entitled to an instruction on possession of a stolen
vehicle as a lesser included offense.

The trial court erred in

refusing to so instruct the jury.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR MISTRIAL
AFTER A JUROR AND A PROSECUTION WITNESS CONVERSED DURING A
RECESS.
During the trial, the parties discovered that a prosecution
witness, Neil Hailes, had conversed with a juror during a recess.
(R.164).

Part of the conversation was general in nature, but a

portion of the conversation regarded the questions asked of the jury
on voir dire (R.166).

The defendant timely moved the trial court

for mistrial because of the prejudicial effects of the conversation
(R.168).

The trial court found the conversation to be innocuous

and denied the defendant's motion for mistrial. (R.169).
Both the United States and the Utah Constitutions guarantee a
criminal defendant a fair trial by an impartial jury.

The Sixth

Amendment to the United States Constitution, states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defense.
Similarly, Article I Section 10 of the Constitution of Utah
provides for criminal trial by an impartial jury.
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When a juror comes into contact and converses with a witness

I
or an officer of the court, a serious issue arises as to whether
that juror can fulfill his duty of impartially examining evidence
and testimony presenl ed it trial.

Recognizing this fact, this

Court, in State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277, 279 (Utah 1984), stated:

"We

have long taken a strict approach in assuring that the constitutional
guarantee of a fair trial iml be compromised by improper contacts
between jurors and witnesses, attorneys, or court personnel."

Although

some other jurisdictions require the defendant to show prejudice
when such contact occurs, I his lour! rejected that position in favor
of a more protective stand, statingthat juror contact with witnesses or parties raises a rebuttable presumption of prejudice.

Id,

The reasons set forth for the rebuttable presumption are twofold.
First, it would be extremely difficult for an Appellant to prove
how, and to what degree, a juror has in fact been influenced by contact
with a witness. Such influence may subconsciously affect the juror's
judgment as to credibility and therefore the mere statement from the
juror that the contact did not affect his decision does not suffice
to rebut the presumption of prejudice. Ici. Secondly, the judicial
process suffers from the appearance of impropriety resulting from a
juroi f» conversation with a witness.

Participants and observers are

left to wonder whether the defendant ted!ly received a fair trial.
For these reasons, prejudice is presumed whenever contact goes beyond
merely incidental, unintended, brief contact.

Id.*

at 280.

Pike further makes clear Ih it the presumption of prejudice
attaches regardless of what was actually said between the juror and
-9-

the witness, as long as that contact went beyond the barest,
incidental contact.

Pike 712 P.2d at 279.

In Pike, the defendant's

convictions on three counts of aggravated assault were reversed
because of contact between
a recess in the trial.

a prosecution witness and jurors during

The witness, a police officer, was asked

by the trial court, outside the presence of the jury, about the
conversation.
was limping.

The witness stated that a juror had asked him why he
The witness testified, "I told him I had bunged my

toe . . . and he asked me how I did that.

And I told him about

slipping in my backyard on the water and breaking . . . "

(Ij3 at 279).

At this point the trial judge interupted the testimony, and therefore
it is unknown whether anything else was discussed.

After the trial

was over the judge questioned the jurors involved and, after the
jurors said they were not affected by the conversation, determined
that the conversation was harmless.

This court reversed, stating:

Due consideration for the potential and often
unprovable tainting of a juror by contacts between
jurors and others involved in a trial that are more
than brief and inadvertent encounters, leads us to
reaffirm the proposition that a rebuttable presumption
of prejudice arises from any unauthorized contact
during a trial between witnesses, attorneys or court
personnel and jurors which goes beyond a mere incidental,
unintended, and brief contact. The possibility that
improper contacts may influence a juror in ways he or
she may not even be able to recognize and that a defendant
may be left with questions as to the impartiality of the
jury, leads to the conclusion that when the contact is
more than incidental, the burden is on the prosecution
to prove that the unauthorized contact did not influence
the juror.
Id. at 279.

Therefore, even if the witness-juror conversation was

unrelated to the substance of the particular trial (as was the case
in Pike), the conversation might still unconstitutionally taint the
trial.

For this reason, the burden is put on the prosecution to
-10-

prove that the unauthorized contact was not prejudicial to i IK
defendant.

Because the prejudicial effects involved are as

likely to be subconscious i conscious, mere statements by the

<-->
)

jurors that they feel they were not affected by the ccntact does
in 1 ififfice to meet the prosecution's burden of proof.

The burden

on the prosecutor is obviously a very difficult one to meet because
of the grave danger of subtle psychological effects resultinu from
juror-witness contacts.
Factually, the case at bai presents an even more egregious situation than Pike,

Like Pike, the conversation in the present case was

largely aenetdl MI nature.

Mi, Hailes told juror Lembke that he

hoped the trial wouldn't last to<

Lonq because he was planning to

drive to Eureka, the town where the witness lived (I lb4)

But un-

like the conversation in Pike, this conversation delved into the actual
trial proceedings.

Mr. Hailes told juror Lembke that he was surprised

at the jurors' responses to questions asked of them during voir dire.
Specifically, Jh

Hailes said that had he been a juror, he would have

responded affirmatively to the question, "W« ul 1 you believe a policeman more than any other person," thus indicating that he felt police
officers were more believable than the average person. (R.166).
Lembke did not respond to this comment

Juror

(I 167). Another juror,

standing with juror Lembke during the recess, also heard this conversation (F<. h» I . Just as had been the case in Pike, juror Lembke said
that this conversation did not effect he) consideration of the case
(R.166).

The other juror present during the conversation was not

questioned.

-I 1

The situation presented by the case at bar is especially
egregious, even more so than that in Pike.

In the present case,

the conversation regarding Mr, Haile's trip to Eureka bred the same
sense of familiarity with the jurors affected as did the police
officer-witness1 conversation about his injured toe in Pike.
This alone would be enough to reverse Mr. Larocco's conviction
under Pike.

But the conversation in the present case went beyond

that in Pike in two important ways.

First, Mr. Hailes's conversa-

tion went beyond the general nature of the Pike conversation.

He

spoke to the two jurors about credibility of police officers and,
specifically, that he would believe police officers above ordinary
citizen witnesses.

Secondly, two jurors heard this conversation,

yet only one was questioned by the judge before he decided to deny
the motion.

In Pike, all the jurors involved were questioned.

There-

fore, in the case at bar, there were no assurances of impartiality
from all affected jurors.
In conclusion, the Appellant contends that he was denied a fair
trial by the witness-juror conversation which occurred during a trial
recess.

The probable effects of this conversation were the subconscious

sense of familiarity bred between the witness and the juror, and the
conscious effect on the juror's assessment of the witness1 credibility.
The prosecutor did not rebut the presumption of prejudice which attaches
to such non-authorized contacts.

Indeed, the present case has even

less assurance of impartiality than Pike, because only one of the two
affected jurors were questioned before the trial judge denied the
Appellant's motion for mistrial.

Therefore, under the protective
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stance reiterated in State v. Pike, the Appellant fs convictions
should be reversed.

i

POINT II
THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S CAR VIOLATED HIS
UNITED STATES AND UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO BE FREE
FROM UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE.
Mr. Padilla, the owner of the used car lot from which the
defendantf Mr. Larocco, was accused of stealing the Ford Mustang,
noti fied the Sheriff's department after seeing a similar Mustang
parked in front of the defendant's house (K.23 1).
later, Detective Robison

A couple of days

went to Mr. Larocco1s house.

The detective

noted the license p] ate number and the car's description, and then
left without trying to speak to Mr. Larocco.

Using the license plate

number, she conducted a Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) search,
which i.nccc/cunj VIN number 3F05H101968. (R.232) . She also learned
that the plates and that VIN number were regi stered to a 1973 Ford
Mach One Mustang, which had been purchased new in 1973 by Neal Hailes
of Salt Lake City.
1985.

The car had been registered ':o M: . Hailes through

The next registration of the car v -

- *•*

c f"endantf Phillip

Larocco, in 1981 (R.233).
Approximately one week later, on June 6, 1985, detective Robison,
with detective Owen and Kip Ingersoll from the Department of Motor
Vehicles, returned to Mr. Laroccofs home and again found the 1973
Ford Mustang parked in front of the home. (R.23 4)

The police officers

looked through the windshield and saw the deist, mount > M3 VIN plaque
which contained VIN 3F05H101968.

This matched the VIN of the car

registered to the defendant; it did not match the VIN of the car stolen
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from the car lot. (R.235-36). Despite this fact, the police officers
then opened the door and entered the car without a warrant. (R.235).
(See Stipulation of Facts submitted in connection with defendant's
motion to dismiss, Addendum "A".)

After opening the door, the police

found a different VIN, 3F05H164088, on the safety standard sticker
located on the inside edge of the door.

This VIN matched that of

the vehicle stolen from the car lot. (R.235).

No attempt was made

to either obtain a warrant or obtain the defendant's consent before
the car was searched.

Only after the search occurred was the defendan

approached and arrested in his home (R.238).
Prior to trial the defendant filed a timely motion to suppress
the evidence obtained by the police as a result of the warrantless
search of the defendant's vehicle (R.110).

That motion was denied.

Similarily, objection was renewed at trial (R.237), thus fulfilling
the requirements of State v. Leslie, 672 P.2d 79 (Utah 1983).
A.

THE DEFENDANT HAD STANDING TO RAISE THE
SEARCH AND SEIZURE ISSUE PRIOR TO TRIAL
AND THEREFORE, AS APPELLANT HEREIN, HAS
STANDING TO RAISE AS ERROR THE TRIAL COURT'S
DENIAL OF THE MOTION.

The United States Supreme Court has emphasized that Fourth
Amendment rights are personal in nature and can be asserted only by
one whose rights are so violated.
(1978).

Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128

Similarly, this Court has held that the Utah Constitutional

protection from unreasonable searches and seizures, Article 1, Section
14, is also personal in nature and can be asserted only b/ one whose
rights are so violated.

State v. Griffin, 626 P.2d 478 (Utah 1981).

For years the issue of standing was governed by Jones v. U.S.,
362 U.S. 257 (1960), which held a defendant had "automatic standing"
if he had been legitimately on the premises where a search had occurred.
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The defendant did not have to be the owner of the thing searched
if he was legitimately on the premises searched.

The Jones standing

rule was significantly altered in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128
(1978), and explicitly overruled in U.S. V. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83
(1980), In Rakas, the Court changed the inquiry from whether the
defendant was legitimately on the premises during the offending
search to whether a defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy
in the item or premises searched.

Salvucci and Rawlings v. Comm. of

Kentucky, 44 8 U.S. 98 (1980) affirmed that focus, and emphasized
that courts should examine the "totaIity of the circumstances" when
deciding a standing issue.
The State may argue on appeal, as did the prosecutor

r ' lie

suppression hearing, that the Appellant, Phillip Larocco, did not have
standing to raise the search and seizure issue at trial and therefore,
does not have standing on appeal to complain of the trial court's
denial of his motion to suppress iR.Lll) . At trial the prosecutor
argued that Mr. Larocco did n« !; [mv.- standing to complain of the search
of the car because Mr. Larocco stole the car (P ill). Therefore,
the prosecutor reasoned that Mr. Larocco had no legitimate privacy .
interest in the car.

But this argument, made in the pretrial motion

to suppress, is logically, as well as constitutionally, flawed. In
order to find lack of standing the trial judge would have to find that
the defendant stole the car, which was the ultimate issue of the pending case.

The defendant has continuously maintained his innocence,

arguing that he purchased the car in 1981.

He produced a Utah Certi-

ficate of Title showing a Ford Mustang, VIN 3F05H101968, as belonging
to him.

Obviously, the question whether or not the defendant stole
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the car had not yet been decided.

For the trial judge to assume

at the pretrial suppression hearing that the defendant stole the
car would violate the defendant's constitutionally guaranteed presumption of innocence.

Furthermore, prior to the illegal search,

officers had only information that Mr. Larocco was the registered
owner of the vehicle.
This Court has dealt with the issue of standing to complain
of a search of a stolen vehicle in several cases.

In State v. Valdez,

689 P.2d 1334 (Utah 1984) and State v. Purcell, 586 P.2d 441 (Utah
1978) , this court held that a defendant does not have standing to
question the search of an automobile where the defendant concedes
he does not own the automobile and cannot demonstrate a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the automobile.

These two cases are

obviously distinguishable from the case at bar.

In neither of these

cases was the ownership of the automobile at issue.

The defendants

did not claim to own the cars involved and it was clear prior to trial
that they did not own the cars.
A different problem arises in cases, such as the present one,
where the defendant claims to be the bona-fide owner of the vehicle in
question and the pending trial is to decide the issue of ownership.
This court recognized the distinction between the present case and
Valdez and Purcell, supra, in State v. Montayne, 414 P.2d 958 (Utah
1966).

In that case, the car searched clearly belonged to a car

rental agency, and the defendant made no claim of ownership.
Court stated:
In order for appellant to have standing to
raise the issue of an unlawful arrest, the
sole prerequisite is that he claim a proprietary or possessory interest in the searched
or seized property. Simpson v. United States,
346 F.2d 291 (10th Cir. 1965). In Simpson,
supra, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals gave
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This

such standing to a defendant because he claimed
"a possessory interest in the car and his lack of
ownership was not established until after the
search." (emphasis ours) Here, lack of ownership was established with reasonable certainty
before the search, thus distinguishing it from
the Simpson case*

Therefore, it is entirely proper to require of one
who seeks to challenge the legality of a search
as a basis for suppressing relevant evidence that
he alleges, and if the allegation be disputed that
he establish, that he himself was a victim of an
invasion of privacy. Under this philosophy, the
appellant has no standing because he was not a
victim of an invasion of privacy. To give a person
standing who neither alleges nor establishes a
proprietary nor possessory interest in the car and
who, in fact, was without ownership therein, so
determined before the search was made, would clearly
be an extension beyond the scope that the constitutional protection was intended to cover.
(Emphasis added).
Montayne, 414 P.2d at 960.

Thus, consistent with the rationale of

Montayne, in a case in which the defendant alleges ownership of a car
and the issue of legal ownership is unsettled, the defendant has
standing to challenge the search of the vehicle.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals dealt with a similar situation
in Simpson v. U.S., 346 F.2d 291 (10th Cir. 1965).

This case was

cited and distinguished in Montayne and, although decided prior to
Rakas v.Illinois, supra, is directly despositive here.

In Simpson,

the government contended the defendant, who was charged with theft of
an automobile, lacked standing because he was not the owner of the
vehicle searched.

The court explained the inconsistency of this

contention:
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Such a construction of the Fourth Amendment would
totally negate the effect of the Weeks-McNabb exclusionary rule in regard to automobiles. Federal
officers could search cars at will and, of all
defendants prosecuted for automobile theft, only those
who actually owned the automobiles could raise Fourth
Amendment objections successfully. Moreover, the proof
of ownership would be sufficient to quash the prosecution for theft of the automobile.
Simpson, 346 F.2d at 294.

Many other jurisdictions follow the

Simpson standing rule. See eg., Glisson v. United States, 406 F.2d
423 (5th Cir. 1969); Cotton v. United States, 371 F.2d 385 (9th Cir.
1967); United States v. Graham, 391 F.2d 439 (6th Cir. L968);
United States v. Golembiewski, 437 F.2d 1212 (8th Cir. 1971);
United States v. Jamerson, 549 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir. 1977) .
Obviously, the prosecution's standing argument would require
a defendant to prove his innocence of the automobile theift charge
before he would have standing to challenge the automobile search.
But if the defendant had such proof, there would be no need to challeng
the automobile search because the theft charges would be quashed.
Thus, the practical effect of the prosecution's argument would be to
strip the standing from all people accused of automobile theft, rendering all police searches of automobiles in such cases unchallengeable.
In conclusion, the Appellant contends that he had standing to
challenge the automobile search of what, he has continually contended,
was his car.

The Appellant was not required to prove his innocence

of the underlying automobile theft charges before being granted
standing.

To so require would be to deny the defendant his presumption

of innocence and would amount to an unconstitutional shift in the
burden of proof from the state to the defendant.

It is uncertain from

the record whether the trial judge's denial of the defendant's motion
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to suppress was based upon a finding of lack of standing, or whether

I
the denial was based on the merits of the motion.

Mr. Larocco

clearly had standing to complain of the search prior to trial, and
therefore, has standing to challenge the trial court's denial of his
motion to suppress.
B.

THE WARRANTLESS AUTOMOBILE SEARCH VIOLATED
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF TH$ UTAH CONSTITUTION.

The United States Supreme Court has constantly held that
police may not conduct a search unless they first procure a warrant
from a neutral magistrate.

In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,

(1967) the Court held that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment subject only to a few specifically established, well-delineated exceptions.

The Court placed the burden on

the party seeking an exemption from the constitutional mandate to
prove that the circumstances of the situation made the warrantless
search imperative.

McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948).

The Court has continually stressed that these "exceptions" are few
and are jealously and carefully drawn.

Steagald v. United States,

451 U.S. 204 (1981); Arkansas v. Saunders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
i)

ENTRANCE INTO AN AUTOMOBILE TO ASCERTAIN THE
VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER IS A SEARCH WITHIN
THE MEANING OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND INDEPENDENT OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, A SEARCH WITHIN THE MEARNING OF ARTICLE I SECTION 14 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH.

A difference of opinion exists among courts regarding the
applicability of the Fourth Amendment to vehicle searches for the
purposes of ascertaining the vehicle identification number (VIN).
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The minority position espoused most strongly by the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, is that the entrance into and search of a vehicle
for the purpose of ascertaining the VIN is not a search within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment; therefore, police are free
to enter any vehicle to ascertain the vehicle identification number
without having a warrant or meeting the warrant exception requirements
of the United States Constitution.
644 (5th Cir. 1970).

United States v. Polk, 433 F.2d

The rationale for this holding is that an

individual can have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the VIN.
The Polk holding had drawn sharp criticism from corrmentators
and courts.

Professor LaFave stated:

Although this reasoning is not without some
force, the conclusion in Polk that entry of a
vehicle to find the VIN is no search and thus
is not "within the scope of the Fourth Amendment11
is unsound. That form of police surveillance, it
is submitted, should not go totally unregulated by
constitutional restraints, for that would mean that
police could enter any particular car on a whim and
that they could make wholesale entries of cars on
nothing more than a hope that one of them mighr
turn out to be stolen. Such surveillance intrudes
upon a justified expectation of privavy and thus,
as Katz v. United States teaches, is subject to
Fourth Amendment limitations.
LaFave, I Search and Seizure at 359-60. As Professor LaFave points
out, under the Polk holding, the police could enter any vehicle on a
whim, the probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment would not
apply.
Further problems with the Polk rationale were explained by Judge
Godbold, dissenting, in United States v. Johnson, 431 F.2d 441 (5th Cir.
1969) :
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An argument can be constructed that there is
a difference where the police invasion is to seek
identification numbers. I. e., because identification numbers, secret and otherwise, are for identification purposes the citizen can have no reasonable
expectation of their remaining private- they are for
identification, ergo, the citizen must expect them to
be available to the police for the purpose for which
intended. But the function of being an identification
device does not exempt the device itself, or the instrumentality it identifies, from the Fourth Amendment. In
our increasingly complex world our motor vehicles are not
the only things numbered for identification. So are such
tangible effects as household appliances, lawn mowers,
outboard motors, and even the watches on our wrists.
Add to the list such papers and documents kept in home,
safe deposit box or on the person, as bank checks,
drivers1 licenses, social security cards, credit cards,
insurance policies, securities, and deeds and mortgages,
and the automobile registration papers often carried
in the glove compartment of the car. All of these items
have primary or secondary qualities of identification,
but this does not subject them, when not in plain view,
to being sought out by police action beyond the reach
of the Fourth Amendment.
Thus with today's pervasive use of non-private identification numbers
on private property, ranging from vehicles to household appliances
to personal records, the Polk rationale would justify warrantless police
entrance into homes and personal effects as well as vehicles.

A real

danger of the Polk rationale is that such entrances into private places
will be made under the pretext of identification inspections in order
to gain entrance where no probable cause exists for a search warrant.
The better reasoned, and probably majority, approach is that
followed by the

Tenth Circuit.

In Simpson v. U.S., 346 F.2d 291

(10th Cir. 1965) , police suspected the defendant of having stolen the
car he had driven to the hotel at which he was staying.

The police

went to the hotel and, upon learning that the defendant had neither
money nor identification, arrested him for vagrancy and towed the
vehicle to the police station.

The next day, a police officer entered
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the car and obtained a VIN.

That VIN provided most of the evidence

used against the defendant at his trial on car theft charges.

The

Simpson court held that an entrance into a car is a search within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and the warrantless search
of the vehicle was unlawful.

The court reasoned that the car was

the object being searched and the VIN was the object seized, stating,
,f

[t]here can be no questioning that visual observations may constitute

the fruits of an unreasonable search and seizure and be inadmissible
on that ground ...." Simpson, 346 F.2d at 294.
In summary, the fact that the vehicle search was made in order
to determine the VIN does not remove the search from the limitations
of the Fourth Amendment.

The Fourth Amendment analysis is the same

even where the item sought to be seized is a public document or
record.

As long as that document or record xs located in a place

in which the defendant has a reasonable expectation of privacy, the
Fourth Amendment requirement of a warrant, or a specific warrant
exception, applies.
ii)

POLICE HAD NO PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH
THE VEHICLE

Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), combined with the later
case of Spinelli v. United States, 394 U.S. 410 (1969), established
a two prong standard for probable cause.

Under the Aguilar-SpineHi

standard, probable cause requires:
(1)

Facts and information supplied by an informant
if the informant can be shown to be reliable
and his information credible.

(2)

Other facts and information known by the police
officers from which they could reasonably conclude
that a criminal activity was being carried on, or
that evidence of a crime is where it is purported
to be.
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Although the U.S. Supreme Court has held that strict compliance with
the Aguilar-Spinelli standard is not absolutely required so long as
the totality of the circumstances demonstrates probable cause
(Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)), thisi Court and other courts
continue to recognize the Aguilar-Spinelli standard as an important
probable cause guideline.

State v. Bailey, 675 E2d 1203 (Utah 1984).

In the present case, police had no probable cause to justify
the search of the Appellant's car.

After finding the car parked

in front of the defendant's home, the police approached the vehicle
and looked through the windshield to see the VIN on the dashboard.
This action was legal because it did not require entrance into the
automobile, as the dash mounted VIN can be seen from the street.

This

VIN did not match the VIN of the vehicle stolen from the car lot.
Instead, the VIN was registered to the defendant.

Furthermore, the

dash mounted VIN appeared to be correct and did not seem to be tampered
with. (R. 283).
At that point police should have either continued their investigation or attempted to obtain the defendant's consent to enter the car.
The fact that the car's VIN did not match that of the stolen car left
the police officers without probable cause to search the car.

The

police actions in entering the car at that point were based on no
more than a hunch.

The U.S. Supreme Court has held on a number of

occasions that hunches will not suffice where probable cause is lacking.
See, eg., Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
iii)

EVEN IF PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTED, THE SEARCH
DID NOT MEET ANY EXCEPTIONS TO THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT WARRANT REQUIREMENT.

Several carefully defined exceptions to the warrant requirement
exist.
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In State v. Harris, 671, P.2d 175 (Utah 1983), this Court listed
the exceptions:

1) consent searches, 2) searches and seizures made in

pursuit, 3) searches and seizure of contraband in areas lawfully
accessible to the public, 4) seizure of evidence in plaLn view after
lawful intrusion, 5) searches and seizures incident to Lawful arrest
based on probable cause under exigent circumstances, and 6) searches
and seizures of automobiles under exigent circumstances.

Id., at 179.

In the present case, the only exception that could possibly apply is
the last of those listed, the "automobile exception."
The automobile exception was first enunciated in Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).

In Carroll, police stopped a car. Police

had probable cause to believe the car contained liquor and, after
searching it, liquor was discovered and seized.
lenged the warrantless search of his car.

The Appellant chal-

The Supreme Court reasoned

that some warrantless searches of automobiles are allowable even where
the same search of a fixed building would violate the Fourth Amendment.
The distinction between buildings and automobiles centers on the
mobility of automobiles and the consequent danger that an automobile
will be moved, thus causing the loss of evidence.

The Carroll court

held that where police have probable cause to search a moving automobile which they have just stopped, they may do so without a warrant
because of the exigencies of the situation.

The exigencies found

by the Court to justify the warrantless search were two fold.

First,

the automobile driver and passengers were put on notice of the police
knowledge of their wrongdoing when they are stopped.

Secondly, because

of the mobility of the automobile, there would be a high probability of
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evidence being lost or destroyed if the police were required to
obtain a search warrant before searching or seizing the automobile.
Thus, the Court established a limited warrant exception for automobiles where such exigent circumstances are present.
The Supreme Court, since Carroll, has made it clear that the
Carroll automobile exception is limited to situations in which exigencies make it impossible or highly impractical to obtain a
warrant.

The exigencies found in Carroll to justify the warrantless

automobile search are not present in the case at bar.
case the car was parked, not moving as in Carroll.

In the present

Also distinguishing

this case from Carroll, is the fact that the car was unoccupied, and
that the defendant

was unaware of the police investigation of him

since contact was never made with him until his arrest.

Furthermore,

the police knew in advance the location of the car and they knew
they would want to obtain the VIN from the car.

This advance knowledge

was not present in Carroll.
A case dealing with the automobile exception which ijs factually
very similar to the case at bar is Coolidge v. New Hampshire,403 U.S.
443 (1971).

In Coolidge, the police suspected the defendant may have

been involved in a murder.

After performing an investigation, police

arrested the defendant in his house and seized his automobile which
was parked in the driveway.

The automobile was subsequently towed to

the police station where it was searched and vacuumed for evidence.
The Court held that, because police knew of the presence of the automobile and planned to seize it, no exigent circumstances existed to
justify police failure to obtain a valid warrant, and the fruits of
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the unconstitutional seizure of the automobile were inadmissible.
The Court explained the factors leading to its conclusion:
Since the police knew of the presence of
the automobile and planned all along to seize
itf there was no "exigent circumstance" to
justify their failure to obtain a warrant.
Here. . . the determining factors are advanced
police knowledge of the existence and location
of the evidence, police intention to seize it,
and the ample opportunity for obtaining a warrant.
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 478, 482.

The Court distinguished between a

search of a moving vehicle which had been stopped (as ii Carroll)
and the search of a stationary unoccupied vehicle (as in. Coolidge):
The stopping of a vehicle on the open highway
and a subsequent search amount to a major interference in the lives of the occupants. Carroll held
such an interference to be reasoncible without a
warrant, given probable cause. It may be thought
to follow a fortiori that the seizure and search
here—where there was no stopping and the vehicle
was unoccupied - were also reasonable, since the
intrusion was less substantial, although there were
no exigent circumstances whatever. Using reasoning
of this sort, it is but a short step to the position
that it is never necessary for the police to obtain a
warrant before searching and seizing an automobile,
provided that they have probable cause.

If the police may, without a warrant, seize and
search an unoccupied vehicle parked on the owrer's
private property, not being used for any illiegal purpose,
then it is hard to see why they need a warrant to seize
and search a suitcase, a trunk a shopping bagr or any
other portable container in a house, garage, cr back
yard.
The fundamental objection, then, to the line of
argument adopted by Mr. Justice White in his dissent in
this case and in Chimel v. California, supra, is that
it proves too much. If we were to agree with Mr. Justice
White that the police may, whenever they have probable
cause, make a warrantless entry for the purpose of making
an arrest, and that seizures and searches of automobiles
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are like wise per se reasonable given probable
cause, then by the same logic any search or
seizure could be carried out without a warrant
and we would simply have read the Fourth Amendment out of the Constitution.
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 479-80.

Thus, automobiles, like all other

private property, are protected from warrantless search and seizure
unless exigencies exist compelling the immediate warrantless search
and seizure.
Following Coolidge, the Texas Supreme Court further clarified the
distinction between moving vehicles and parked "movable" automobiles.
In Hudson v. Texas, 588 S.W.2d 348 (Texas 1979), the court held that
the exigency required for a valid warrantless search of an automobile
must be one of the following:

1)

that the car was moving when

stopped or, 2) if parked and unoccupied, that the car is movable and
that the owner is alerted that the police are investigating and that
the car would in fact have been moved if police did not immediately
seize it.

The court stated:

The reason we carefully distinguish beteen
"moving" and "movable" vehicle is the readily
apparent difference in exigencies involved. A
car stopped on a public highway containing alerted
occupants carries a high risk that "the car's
contents may never be found again if a warrant must
be obtained." Chambers v. Maroney, supra 3 99 U.S. at
at 51, 90 S.Ct. at 1981. That same exigency may
arise with an unoccupied parked car under certain
circumstances. The Court in Cardwell decided that
• sufficient exigent circumstances did exist for two
reasons. First, "[h]ere, as in Chambers v. Maroney,. .
the automobile was seized from a public place where
access was not meaningfully restricted." Cardwell v.
Lewis, supra 417 U.S. at 593, 94 S.Ct. at 2471.
Second, there was evidence that the defendant "asked
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one of his attorneys to see that his wife and family
got the car, and that the attorney relinquished the
keys to the police inorder to avoid a physical confrontation." Id. at 595, 94 S.Ct. at 2471-2472.
Hudson, 588 S.W. 2d at 354.

Hudson served to clarify the exingencies

announced by the U.S. Supreme Court in Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S.
583 (1974) under which a parked movable car can be seized and
searched without a warrant.
The present case is strikingly similar to Coolidge, supra.
Here, as in Coolidge, police had conducted an investigation before
seizing and searching the automobile.
at his house and was unoccupied.

The defendant's :ar was parked

Police knew where the defendant

lived and the car had been seen at that location on a number of
previous occasions.

There is no evidence indicating that the defendani

knew the police were investigating him, nor was there any other evidenc
that the police were compelled to immediately search the car.

Indeed,

if the police did have probable cause to search the vehicle, the
leisurely pace of their investigation demonstrates that they had ample
opportunity to obtain a warrant before seizing and searching the car.
When a warrantless search or seizure is challenged, it is the prosecutor's burden to demonstrate the exigent circumstances justifying it.
United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951).

Just as in Coolidge,

no recognized exigencies existed, and the fruit of the illegal search
should have been suppressed.
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POINT III
THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
RIGHTS TO A FAIR TRIAL AND TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
WHEN JURORS SAW HIM SHACKLED AND IN POLICE CUSTODY ON AT
LEAST TWO OCCASIONS DURING TRIAL.
After the jury had returned its verdict, the trial court
learned that two jury members had seen things during the course of
trial which clearly indicated that Mr. Laroccp was in custody at
the time.

One juror saw the defendant being led downstairs by a

uniformed officer (R.328).

Although the record is not clear, the

probability is substantial that the defendant was handcuffed at the
time.

Another juror saw Mr. Larocco entering a police car. (Id..).

The defendant moved for a mistrial (R.327).

After hearing the jurors

say they were uneffected by what they saw, Judge Dee denied the
motion (R.329).
InEstellev. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976), the United States
Supreme Court dealt with the issue of juror prejudice arising from
the identification of the defendant as being incarcerated.

The

Court held that trying a defendant in identifiable prison garb
violated not only the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair
trial, but also the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection
of the law.

The Court stated:

Similarly troubling is the fact that compelling
the accused to stand trial in jail garb operates
usually against only those who cannot post bail prior
to trial. Persons who can secure release are not
subjected to this condition. To impose the condition
on one category of defendants, over objection, would
be repugnant to the concept of equal justice embodied
in the Fourteenth Amendment. Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12, 100 L Ed 891, 76 S.Ct. 585, 55 ALR2d 1055 (1956).
Williams, 425 U.S. at 505-06.

However, the Court observed that no
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fundamental rights were involved and therefore, the issue is waived
unless a timely objection is made.
This Court has significantly expanded the Williams rationale,
perhaps in recognition of the fact that few, if any, rights are
more fundamental than the right to fair trial and the right to equal
protection of the laws.

In Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341 (Utah 1980),

this Court, agreeing with Williams, stated, "The prejudicial effect
that flows from a defendant's appearing before a jury in identifiable
prison garb is not measurable, and it is so potentially prejudicial
as to create a substantial risk of fundamental unfairness in a crimina.
trial."

Smith, 617 P.2d at 344.

However, the Court announced a more

protective stance than that constitutionally mandated in Williams.
First, the Court held that because basic fundamental rights are involved, a waiver cannot be presumed by the failure of defense counsel
to object to the defendant's appearance in prison clothes.

Secondly,

this Court placed a burden on the trial judge to ascertain whether
the defendant wished to waive his right not to appear in prison clothes
Smith, 617 P.2d at 344-45.

In so holding, this Court expressly over-

ruled Gentry v. Smith, 600 P.2d 1007 (Utah 1979), a case closely
following Estelle v. Williams, supra, holding the objection to have
been waived if not made at trial.

Thus, although many jurisdictions

have chosen to closely follow Estelle v. Williams, supra, this Court
has taken a much more cautious, protective approach in recognition of
the immeasurable, often subconscious prejudicial impact on jurors who
identify the defendant as a jail or prison inmate.
Regarding the use of shackles or restraining devices on the
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defendant or a defense witness at trial, the California Supreme
Court has continuously held, since its 1871 decision of People
v, Harrington, 42 Cal. 165, that such devices are manifestly
prejudicial to the defendant in the eyes of the jury and are not
to be used except in extreme situations where a special need is
demonstrated.

The court explained its reasoning in People v. Duran,

127 Cal Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322, 1327 (Ca. 1976):
We believe that it is manifest that the shackling of a criminal defendant will prejudice him in
the minds of the jurors. When a defendant is charged
with any crime, and particularly if he is accused of
a violent crime, his appearance before the jury in
shackles is likely to lead the jurors to infer that
he is a violent person disposed to commit crimes of
the type alleged. (See Illinois v. Allen (1970) 397
U.S. 337, 344, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed2d 353; Odell v.
Hudspeth (10th Cir. 1951) 189 F.2d 300.) The removal
of physical restraints is also desirable to assure
that "every defendant is . . . brought before the court
with the appearance, dignity, and self respect of a free
and innocent man." (Eaddy v. People (1946) 115 Colo.
488, 492, 174 P.2d 717, 719; see also Illinois v. Allen,
supra, 397 U.S. 337, 350-351, 90 SJet. 1057, 25 L.Ed, 2d
353 (Brennan, J. concurring); Kennedy v. Cardwell, supra,
487 F.2d 101, 104; Helwig, Coping with the Unruly Criminal
Defendant: The Option of the Allei> Case (1971) 7 Gonzaga
L.Rev (17.) Finally, the United States Supreme Court
has acknowledged that physical restraints should be used
as a last resort not only because of the prejudice created
in the jurors1 minds, but also because "the use of this
technique is itself something of an affront to the very
dignity and decorum of judicial proceedings that the
judge is seeking to uphold." (Illinois v. Allen, supra,
397 U.S. 337, 344, 90 S. Ct. 1057, 1061.)
The court then reaffirmed its rule "that a defendant cannot be subjected to physical restraints of any kind . . . while in the jury's
presence, unless there is a showing of manifest need for such restraints
Duran, 545 P.2d at 1327.
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In the present case, the two jurors saw the defendant shackled
and in custody after the trial had adjourned for the lunch recess
preceeding the jury's deliberations (R.327).

The fact that the

observations were made during an adjournment rather than during
trial proceedings does not distinguish this case from the previouslycited cases.

Although the State may have had a legitimate security

interest in having the defendant shackled and in custody as he was
leaving his trial, the trial court clearly erred in allowing jurors
to view the defendant so restrained.

Even the momentary viewing

of Mr. Larocco in custody established him as an incarcerated detainee
in the minds of the jurors.

The prejudice flowing from such momentary

viewing is precisely the same as the situation in which the defendant
is brought into court with prison garb or shackles on.

The two jurors1

perceptions of the defendant were thereafter tainted by their knowledge
that the defendant was being restrained and incarcerated at the time.
The defendant had a right to be brought before the jurors, "with the
appearance, dignity, and self-respect of a free and innocent man,"
Puran, supra.
A defendant who is able to post bail has no problem presenting
the "appearance, dignity, and self-respect of a free and innocent man."
Because such a defendant has money, he goes through trial unincarceratec
and unfettered by shackles.

But the defendant who cannot afford

bail is subjected to shackles as well as police custody.

For this

reason, as the Supreme Court noted in Estelle v. Williams, supra juror
identification of the defendant as an inmate may violate the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the law as ^ell as the
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Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a fair trial.

For these reasons,

Mr, Laroccofs convictions should be reversed.

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE JURY TO CONVICT THE
APPELLANT OF BOTH THEFT OF AN OPERABLE MOTOR VEHICLE AND
POSSESSION OF A STOLEN VEHICLE; THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT POSSESSION OF A STOLEN
VEHICLE IS A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF THEFT OF AN OPERABLE
VEHICLE.
The Appellant, Phillip Larocco, appeals from a judgment and
conviction for Theft of an Operable Motor Vehicle, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 (1953 as amended),
and for Possession of a Stolen Vehicle, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-1-112 (1953 am amended).

Prior to

trial Mr. Larocco submitted a proposed jury instruction which would
have instructed the jurors that possession of a stolen vehicle is
a lesser included offense of theft of an operable vehicle (R.94).
(Addendum B ) .

The trial court refused this instruction, instead

instructing the jury that they could return convictions for both
offenses (R.78). (Addendum C ) .

The defendant objected to this

instruction and to the court's refusal to give his proposed lesser
included offense instruction (R.324).
On appeal, Mr. Larocco

makes two related assignments of error

concerning these jury instructions.

First, under Utah Code Ann.

§76-1-402(3) (1953 as amended), the appellant contends that he cannot be convicted for possession of a stolen vehicle and theft of that
same vehicle because the theft offense necessarily encompasses the
possession offense.

Secondly, Mr. Larocco contends that he was entitled
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to an instruction on the lesser offense of possession of a stolen
vehicle.
A.

THE APPELLANT CANNOT BE CONVICTED OF BOTE
THE THEFT OF A MOTOR VEHICLE AND POSSESSION
OF THAT SAME STOLEN VEHICLE.

Utah Code Ann §76-1-402 (3) (1953 as amended) states that accused cannot be convicted of an underlying offense and an included
offense:
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense
included in the offense charged but may not be convicted
of both the offense charged and the included offense.
An offense is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less
than all the facts required to establish the commission
of the offense charged;
One definition of included offense is an offense "established by
proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish
the commission of the offense charged."

Utah Code Ann. §76-1-402 (3)

(a) (1953 as amended).
This Court recently reversed convictions in two cases in which
the defendants were convicted of both underlying offenses and of
offenses included in the underlying offense.

In State \ .

Hill, 674

P.2d 96 (Utah 1983), the defendant was convicted of theft and aggravate
robbery.

This Court held that under the circumstances of that case,

the crime of theft was a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery.
This Court explained that under §76-1-402 (3), "conviction of a lesser
included offense (1) is permitted as an alternate to the charged offensbut (2) is not permitted as an addition to it."

Hill, 674 P.2d at 96.

The Court stated that, for purposes of §76-1-402(3), the greater/lesser
relationship must be determined by comparing the statutory elements of
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the two crimes.

Where the two crimes are such that the greater

cannot be committed without the necessary commission of the lesser,
then as a matter of law, the offenses stand in the relationship of
greater and lesser offenses and the defendant cannot be convicted
of both.

Hill, 674 P.2d at 97.

But where one of the crimes has

multiple variations so that the greater/lesser relationship exists
between some variations of the crimes, but not between others, a court
must apply a secondary test; it must look to the evidence presented
to determine whether there is a greater/lesser relationship between
the variations proven at trial.

Id.. After examining the evidence

presented in Hill, this court found theft to be a lesser included
offense of the variation of aggravated robbery proven in that case.
The remedy exercised by this Court was to reverse the lesser (theft)
conviction and affirm the greater (aggravated robbery) conviction.
This Court again applied the Hill approach in State v. Bradley,
19 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 (Sept. 23, 1985).

In that case, Mr. Bradley

had been convicted of aggravated assault, a third degree felony, and
aggravated burglary, a first degree felony.

After applying the second-

ary evidence based test of Hill, this Court concluded that aggravated
assault was a lesser included offense of the aggravated burglary
and, therefore, the Appellant should not have been convicted of both.
The lesser conviction, aggravated assault, was reversed and the
sentence vacated.
A case directly analagous to the case at bar is Shackelford v.
State, 481 P.2d 163 (Okl. 1971).

In that case, the defendant committed

an armed robbery of a pharmacy, stealing narcotics.
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He was later

apprehended and arrested.

Police found the stolen narcotics in

his automobile. The defendant was convicted of both aggravated
robbery and possession of narcotics; he appealed, claiming a
violation of an Oklahoma statute which states:

"An act or

omission which is made punishable in different ways by different
provisions of this code may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case can be punished under more than one; ..."
Title 21 O.S. Supp. §11 (1970).

The Shackelford Court Followed

the California interpretation of a similar statute, quoting the
case of Neal v. State, 357 P.2d 839 (Ca. 1960):
"Section 654 has been applied not only
where there was but one 'act1 in the ordinary sense * * * but also where a
course of conduct violated more than one
statute * * *. If all of the offenses
were incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished for any one of
such offenses but not for more than
one." 357 P.2d at 843-844.
The Shackelford court then held that the robbery and the possession
both arose out of the same criminal act, and therefore, the defendant
could only be convicted of one or the other.
Significantly, the Shackelford court recognized that the Oklahoma
prohibition of double convictions for the same act is broader than
the the federal constitution's prohibition of double jeopardy:
It is significant that this statute speaks of
an "act or omission" while the double jeopardy prohibition speaks of a conviction or
acquittal of an "offense" as being a bar to
another prosecution for the same "offense."
If an "act" violates two different laws, it
may be two "offenses under double jeopardy
interpretation, but Section II prohibits a
single act being punished more than once under
different statutes.
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Shackelford, 481 P.2d at 165.

The same reasoning likewise applies

to the double conviction prohibition of Utah CQde Annotated §76-1-402
(3) (1953 as amended).

A single act might violate two separate

offenses as defined by the state legislature, and therefore, technically escape the Fifth Amendment double jeopardy prohibition; however,
§76-1-402(3) still prohibits the two convictions where the lesser
offense arises out of the greater offense.

Therefore, §76-1-402(3)

is independent of, and broader than, the Fifth Amendment double
jeopardy prohibition.
Courts examining the issue of double convictions have almost
unanimously followed the Shackelford court in holding that a defendant
cannot be convicted of both theft (or robbery or larceny) and
possession (or receiving or retaining) of the same stolen property.
See E.g., Sundberg v. State, 636 P.2d 619 (Alaska App. 1981); Pierce v.
State, 627 P.2d 211 (Alaska App. 1981); People v. Jackson, 627 P.2d 741
(Colo. 1981); State v. Alvarez,678 P.2d 1132 (Kan. App. 1984); State
v. Hernandez, 689 P.2d 1261 (Mont. 1984); State v. Smith, 670 P.2d 963
(N.M. App. 1983); State v. Richards,621 P.2d 165 (Wash. App. 1980);
People v. Jaramillo, 548 P.2d 706 (Cal. 1976); State v. McPherson,
444 P.2d 5 (Or. 1968).
In the present case, Mr. Larocco was convicted of theft of an
operable motor vehicle, a second degree felony, and of possession of
a stolen vehicle, a third degree felony.

Both convictions related

to the same vehicle, a 1973 Ford Mustang. The Appellant contends that
he could not be convicted of both offenses because the elements of
possession of a stolen vehicle are necessarily included in those of
theft of an operable motor vehicle.
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Utah Code Annotated §76-6-404 (1953 as amended), lists the
elements of theftf the greater offense in this case:
Theft —Elements. — A person commits theft
if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control
over the property of another with a purpose to
deprive him thereof.
Because the theft was of an operable motor vehicle, the offense is
a second degree felony.

U.C.A. §76-6-412(1) (a) (ii) (1953 as amended) .

Utah Code Annotated §41-1-112 proscribes possession of a stolen vehicle
Receiving or transferring stolen vehicle a
felony. Any person who ...
has in his possession any vehicle which he knows
or has reason to believe has been stolen or unlawfully taken, and who is not an officer of the law
engaged at the time in the performance of his duty
as such officer, is guilty of a felony.
By definition, theft contains two elements:

1)

obtaining

or exercising unauthorized control over the property of another,
2) with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
also contains two elements:

1)

Possessing a stolen vehicle

possessing a vehicle, and 2) the

possessor knowing or having reason to believe that it was stolen.
Both of the elements of possession of a stolen vehicle are necessarily
included in the first element of theft.

Under the interpretation

given by the trial court, every theft would give rise to both a theft
conviction and a possession of stolen property conviction.

Conviction

of both violates the Fifth Amendment prohibition of double jeopardy
and/or the broader prohibition of double convictions contained in
U.C.A. §76-1-402(3) (1953 as amended).
For this reason, Phillip Larocco requests this Court to reverse
the lesser conviction (possession of a stolen vehicle) and vacate its
sentence.

Additionally, Appellant contends (see subpoint B, below)
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that he was entitled to an instruction on possession of a stolen
vehicle as a lesser offense of the theft count, and that the trial
court's refusal to so instruct the jury constituted reversible error,
mandating a remand of the theft conviction for retrial.
B.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT POSSESSION OF
A STOLEN VEHICLE IS A LESSER INCLUDED
OFFENSE OF THEFT OF AN OPERABLE VEHICLE.

The importance to an accused of instructions regarding lesser
included offenses has been elaborated on in many cases.

A recent

Utah Supreme Court case, State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983),
dealt with a situation in which the appellant (Baker) was convicted
of burglary.

He appealed, claiming error in the court's refusal to

instruct on the offense of criminal trespass.

This Court, in emphas-

izing the importance of instructions on lesser included offenses
quoted from Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 633, 100 S.Ct. 2382 (1980);
[I]t has long been recognized that [the
lesser included offense] can also h^e beneficial
to the defendant because it affords the jury
a less drastic alternative than th^ choice
between conviction of the offense Charged and
acquittal. State v. Baker, supra, 156
The defendant is entitled to such instructions as a benefit of the
reasonable doubt standard.

This Court then quoted from Keeble v.

United States, 412 U.S. 205, 212-13,93

S.Ct. 1993,1997-98 (1973):

Moreover, it is no answer to petitioner's
demand for a jury instruction on a lesser offense
to argue that a defendant may be better off without
such an instruction. True, if the prosecution has
not established beyond a reasonable doubt every
element of the offense charged, and if no lesser
offense instruction is offered, the jury must, as a
theoretical matter, return a verdi|ct of acquittal.
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But a defendant is entitled to a lesser offense
instruction— precisely because he should not
be exposed to the substantial risk that the
jury's practice will diverge from theory. Where
one of the elements of the offense charged remains
in doubt, but the defendant is plainly guilty of
some offense, the jury is likely to resolve its
doubts in favor of conviction. State v. Baker,
supra, 156-57.
The importance of such lesser offense instructions to a defendant
is clear.

But they are also important to society as a whole, because

such instructions give the jury a choice of convicting the defendant
of a lesser offense rather than simply acquitting him if the prosecutor fails to prove all the elements of the offense charged, but does
prove beyond a reasonable doubt all the elements of a lesser included
offense.
The test given to determine if one offense is a lesser included
offense of another is that found in the Utah Criminal Code.

Utah

Code Annotated &76-l-402(3) (1953 as amended) provides in pertinent
part:
A defendant may be convicted of an offense included
in the offense charged but may not be convicted of
both the offense charged and the included offeise.
An offense is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less
than all the facts required to estciblish the commission of the offense charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form or preparation to commit the offense
charged or an offense otherwise included therein; or
(c) It is specifically designated by the statute as
a lesser included offense.
In State v. Baker, supra, this Court clarified much of the
confusion which had existed regarding whether to apply the "necessarily
included offense" doctrine or an evidence-based analysis in considering
what constitutes a lesser included offense and when a jury should be
-40-

instructed on a lesser included offense.

The "necessarily included

offense" doctrine, the stricter of the two standards, applies only
when it is the prosecutor seeking the instruction on the lesser
included offense.

But when it is the defendant who requests the

instruction, an evidence-based analysis is employed, for the reasons
quoted above in Beck v. Alabama, supra, and Keeble v. United States,
supra.
In State v. Brown, 694 P.2d 587 (Utah 1984), this Court, relying
on State v. Baker, supra, held that the appellant, Mr. Brown, who
who was convicted of aggravated kidnapping, was entitled to an instruction on the lesser included offense of assault.

This court stated:

When it is the defendant, however, who requests the
instruction, we held in Baker that an evidence-based
analysis must be used in order to afford the accused
the full benefit of the reasonable doubt standard.
We determined that requirements must be met under our
statutory system in order for the defendant to be
entitled to an instruction on a lesser offense. First,
the statutory elements of the offenses must be related
in some way; there must be some overlap in the definitions of the two crimes, even though th^y need not meet
the totally "included" standard. This Comparison of
the statutory elements helps in determining whether an
offense is an "included offense" under §76-1-402(3)(a),
which provides that an offense is included when "[i]t
is established by proof of the same or less than all
the facts required to establish the commission of the
offense cahrged." Second, we held that the court must
instruct on the lesser offense only if there is some
evidence at trial that, if believed by the jury, would
provide a "rational basis for a verdict of acquitting
the defendant of the offense charged and convicting him
of the included offense." U.C.A., 1953, §76-1-402(4).
Brown, supra, at 589.
The first step in the evidence-based analysis is a comparison
of the statutory elements of the offense of which the Appellant
was convicted, theft, with the elements of iphe lesser offense on
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which the Appellant requested the jury be instructed, possession
of a stolen vehicle.

As discussed in subpoint A, above, theft

consists of two elements: 1) obtaining or exercising unauthorized
control over the property of another, 2) with a purpose to deprive
him thereof.

(U.C.A. §76-6-404).

also consists of two elements:

Possession of a stolen vehicle

1)

possessing a vehicle, which

2) the possessor knows or has reason to believe was stolen.
§41-1-12).

(U.C.A.

As discussed in subpoint A, above, both elements of

possession of a stolen vehicle are necessarily contained within
the first element of theft.

Although the Appellant merely has the

burden to show some overlap of the elements of the crimes (Brown,
supra,) it is clear that every possession of a stolen vehicle is an
"exercise [of] unauthorized control over the property of another,"
and is therefore, necessarily a lesser included offense of theft.
The second step in the evidence-based analysis requires consideration of whether some evidence was presented at trial which, if believed
by the jury, would provide a rational basis for acquitting the defendan
of the greater offense and convicting on the lesser included offense.
Brown, supra.
bar.

Such a rational basis clearly exists in the case at

Significant problems concerning identification are found in the

testimony of David Luce, the used car salesman who identified the
Appellant as being the person who test drove the car but never returned
it.

Mr. Luce had described the person who stole the car as being

5 f 8"-5 f 10" in height and weighing 160-165 pounds (R.202), which was
approximately Mr. Luce's size.

But at trial defense couns;el pointed

out to the jury the obvious fact that Phillip Larocco is a tall, very
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heavy set man (R.310).

Although the record does not make clear

exactly how tall he is nor how much Mr. Larocco weighs, his sister,
Paula Bone, testified that the defendant wore a size extra-extralarge shirt and that it was very difficult to find pants large
enough for him (R.291).

Furthermore, both Ms. Bone and Darrel

Norman, the Appellant's brother-in-law, testified that Mr. Larocco
was at least as heavy in 1981 (at the time the car was stolen),
as he was at trial (R.290,295).
The weak identification weighed against the theft charge, but
had no bearing on the possession of a stolen motor vehicle charge.
Mr. Luce's testimony was the only evidence that Mr. Larocco stole
the vehicle.

Therefore, the very innacurate identification of the

Appellant provided a rational basis for acquitting the Appellant of
theft but still convicting him of possession of a stolen vehicle.
The Appellant does not bear the burden of showing that such an outcome
was likely; Appellant need only demonstrate a rational basis for such
action, in keeping with this Court's recognition that lesser included
offense instructions should be liberally available to defendants where
a possibility exists that the jury might choose to convict of a lesser
offense (Baker,

Brown, supra).

The evidence in this case presented

such a possibility.
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CONCLUSION
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, the Appellant,
Phillip Lorocco, asks this Court to reverse his convictions and
remand his case to the lower court for either dismissal of the
charges, or a new trial.
Respectfully submitted this 1

day of July, 19 86.

LISA J. &EMAL
Attorney for Appellant
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Utah,

by

Defendant,

stipulate

and

by

through

and

Creighton

through

to the following

his

C.

counsel

facts for pur-

pr-^t?? o v the Defendants Motion to Suppress:
In June of 1981 r a 1973 Ford Mustang

(Vin #3F05H164

OP.P.) ^V:noc\. by Will lap Pa.dilla v/as stolen from his car lot, Stace

Auto Sal^s, 41*7 Q 0 # state Street, by a nan who took the car
for

a t — t drive and n^ver returned it.

ti'-p ran was Dr>vp Luce,

Luce nad

The salesman assisting

seen the man several

tines

T^ior to the t e ^ drive and later described him to the police as
resenh» Log Don Oelouise, the actor.

Wnen the man

failed to

~ t i pu 1 a t L on o f F a c t s

Case CP 8 5-742
Page 2
return the vehicle or pay for it, Mr. Padilla reported the
theft to the no lice.
Nearly four years later, in May of 1985, Dave Luce,
row a salesman
had

C^"VT»P

T"?.n who

p

or Valley Ford, recognized the Defendant, who

into test drive another Ford Mustang, as the same
had

absconded

with

Padilla fs

car

in

1981.

Luce

obtained information from a fellow.salesman, Patrick Sullivan,
who was

assisting

the Defendant.

Defendant

had

given his

name as Phillip Wilson and his address as 7442 Gardenia Ave.
At that time n<?fen<iant appeared to be on foot, out 2 or 3
days later luce noticed the Defendant driving a Mustang which
appeared to hir to be the same vehicle stolen from Padilla's
lot in

1981.

Luce called

above information,

which

Padilla
Padilla

and conveyed to him che
later passed

on to Linda

''"•b:son of the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office.
After receiving the call from Luce, Padilla went to
the vicinity of 7442 Gardenia Ave, and although there was no
such andress, he located his vehicle parked in front of the
residence at

724 2 Gardenia Ave.

He recognized the car not

only f>om its genera] appearance, out from a repaired interior
r]o^'' pa^e]. which his shop had worked von back in 1981 prior to
offrrinq the car Tor sale.

Padilla called the police.

He

Stipulation of Facts
Case CR 8 5-^4/.
D
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did not see or speak to the Defendant.
After receiving the call, Detective Robison went to
the vicinity

and

located

the

vehicle

parked

Defendant ' s residence at 7242 Gardenia Ave.

in

front

of

She noted the

license number of the car, its description, and the address,
an^> left

without

further

residence at that tire.

approaching

the

vehicle

or

the

She conducted, further investigation

by running the plat-,'; number and receiving back an associated
VTN number {3F05H10]968). *A VIN search through the Department
of Motor Vehicles revealed that the car which was originally
registered under such number, a 1973 Mach One Ford Mustang,
vas purchased new in 197 3 by Neal Hailes of Salt Lake City.
It was registered to Hailes through 1975.

The next registra-

tion entry for such VIN number was to the Defendant in 1981.
Approximately one week after first seeing the
vehicle, Detective

Robison

returned

to Defendant's

address

anri saw the vehicle parked in front of his residence.

Kip

IngersoJ.l from the Division of Motor Vehicles also responded
to the scene.

The police looked through the windshield and

saw * vi KI number, 3F05H101968, which did not match the VIN of
the v?hide which had been stolen from Padilla in 1981.

The

police opened

the

the

unlocked

driver's

door

and

checked

S f .1 p u 1 n t i o n oft ^ a c t s
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safety standard
the reportedly
they opened
they did

sticker
stolen

th«

not

Defendant or

car's

door

have

car's inspection

to

a

anyone

located thereon.
VIN,

3F05H164088.

check

the

warrant,

nor

at

his

There they

the

had

residence

VIN

the

identification
they

to

number

time

sticker,

contacted

notify

or that he was a suspect

After finding

At

located

h:.m of

the
the

in an auto theft.

of

the

stolen

car

inside the door panel, the police contacted Defendant at his
residence.

He acknowledged, after Miranda, his possession of

t h e " e h i r.. i P r telling
it" from

Creator

Chevrolet

sequently produced
ot:

p_T_o-*l

?.nd

them that he owned

a

in the

it, having
1981.

He sub-

B title to the

venicle, bearing

the date

vi!*

3F05H101968.

number

of

summer of

purchase

The

police

arrested the Defendant on the instant charges.
After impounding the vehicle, Kip Ingersoll of the
Division of

M

otor Vehicles also located another VIN number on

the car's frame confirming in to be Padilla's vehicle (3F05H16^
0RQ).

Thprp^ftpr

they

checked

the VIN tag on the dashboard

( 3 r n^H] 0] qr»R > apH found that it had been glued on rather than
rivited,

Subsequent

investigation

revealed

that the vehicle

originally registered to Neal Hailes with that VIN number had
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been totalled in a car wreck in December of 1975.
Respectfully submitted

this

fp"

day

of

August

1 oqc,

CREIGHTON C. HORTON, II
Deputy County Attorney

LISA REMAW
Attorney for Defendant

V ;

--

^

••" '* -

ADDENDUM B
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED LESSER-INCLUDED INSTRUCTION

INSTRUCTION NO.

11

When you retire to consider your verdicts, you will select
one of your members to act as foreperson who will preside over your
deliberat ions.
Your verdicts in this case must be either:
Guilty of THEFT es charged in Count I of the Information;
or
Not Guilty of Count I, THEFT;
And/Or
Guilty of POSSESSION OF A STOLEN VEHICLE as charged in
Count II cf the Information; or
Net Guilty of Count II, P08ESSI0N OF A STOLEN VEHICLE;
as your deliberations may determine.
This being a criminal case, a unanimous concrrence of
all jurors is required to find a verdict.

Your verdicts must be

in writing and when found, must be signed and dated by your foreperson and then returned by you to this court.

When your verdicts

have been found, notify the bailiff that you are ready to report
to the Court.

Dated a t Salt Lake City, Utah v ^ / ^ g . / ^

ff

7^

%5>

JUDGE

H. DiXON MEDLEY
CLE^K ,
r^r,

y

Deouty Clerk

ADDENDUM C
TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTION

INSTRUCTION NO.

^_

If the State has failed to convince you beyond a
reasonable doubt of the existence of all of the elements of
the offense of Auto Theft, you may consider whether the
Defendant is guilty of the lesser included offense of
Possession of a Stolen Vehicle.

Before you can find PHILLIP

LAROCCO guilty of the crime of Possession of a Stolen Vehicle,
the State must prove each of the following elements beyond a
reasonable doubt:
1.

That on or about the 6th day of June, 1985, in

Salt Lake County, State of Utah, PHILLIP PAUL LAROCCO had in
his possession a motor vehicle that had been stolen or unlawfally
taken.
2.

That PHILLIP PAUL LAROCCO knew or had reason to

believe the vehicle had been stolen or unlawfully taken.
3.

Tnat the Defendant was not an officer of the lav;

engaged at that time in the performance of his duty as such an
officer.
If you believe that the evidence established each and
all of these essential elements of the offense beyond a resonable
doubt, it is you duty to convict the Defendant.

On the other

hand, if the evidence has failed to establish one or more of
said elements, then you should find the pefendant Not Cuilty.

